We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which allows for one-dimensional auctionspecific unobserved heterogeneity, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008) . Our approach can accommodate a wide variety of applications in which some location of the conditional distribution of bids (e.g. min or max of the support, mean, etc.) is increasing in the unobserved heterogeneity. This includes settings in which the econometrician fails to observe the reserve price, the cost of bidding, the number of bidders, or some factor ("quality") with a non-linear effect on bidder values.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose a methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auctions with unobserved heterogeneity, in the independent private values framework. By unobserved heterogeneity, we mean auction-specific factors that are observed by the bidders and affect their equilibrium bids. However, these factors are not observed by the econometrician, leading to spurious correlation between the bids for a given auction, even under the assumption of independent private values. Krasnokutskaya (2009) proposed an ingenious approach to identify and estimate such a model, leveraging results from the classical measurement error literature (cf. Li (2002) ). In particular, as long as the unobserved heterogeneity affects bidders' valuations multiplicatively and is independent of the bidder-specific component of each bidder's valuation, two bids per auction are sufficient to identify and estimate the marginal distribution of bidder valuations as well as that of the unobserved heterogeneity. Subsequently, Krasnokutskaya's results have been used in applied analyses of timber auctions (Athey, Levin, and Seira (2005) ), stamp auctions (Asker (2009)) , and procurement auctions (Decarolis (2009) ).
In this paper, we apply findings from the more recent literature on nonclassical measurement error in Hu and Schennach (2008) . Using results from this literature, we obtain non-parametric identification of bidder values under substantially weaker assumptions. In particular, we allow the unobserved heterogeneity to affect bidders' valuations nonlinearly and we do not assume that bidders' private signals are independent of the unobserved heterogeneity. On the other hand, whereas Krasnokutskaya requires only two bids per auction, our identification approach requires two bids plus a third instrument (which could be a third bid). Given such data, we can identify the marginal distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, as well as the distributions of bidder valuations conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity.
Our identification results are similar in spirit to those in d 'Haultfoeille and Fevrier (2008) , who focus on conditionally independent common value ("mineral rights") models. Roberts (2009) takes a control-function approach to identify an ascending auction model with unobserved heterogeneity, using two bids and the reserve price as an instrument. Our identification approach, which is based on measurement error results, is quite distinct from these two papers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline model, develops our main identification result, and provides more discussion of related literature. Section 3 then considers several novel applications, including: unobserved quality (Section 3.1); unobserved reserve price (Section 3.2); unobserved cost of entry (Section 3.3); or an unobserved number of bidders (Section 3.4). Section 4 presents the results of a Monte Carlo simulation of our procedure, while Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
Main result

Baseline model
A fixed set of risk-neutral bidders i = 1, ..., n participates in a first-price auction t, where n ≥ 3. Bidder i's value is distributed as V it = v(X it , Y t ), where X it is privately observed, Y t ∈ Y ⊂ R is an auction t-specific "state" (or "unobserved heterogeneity") that is commonly observed by all bidders but not by the econometrician, and v(·, ·) is a bounded function that is continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in X it . 1 X it are independent across bidders conditional on Y t , with strictly positive density on bounded support. The state-space is allowed to be either discrete (Y ⊂ {1, 2, ...}) or a continuum (Y = [0, 1]). In the continuum case, we will find it convenient to normalize the state so that
In this asymmetric independent private values (IPV) model, Reny and Zamir (2004) establish existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2 Let b t = (b it : i = 1, ..., n) be the profile of bids observed by the econometrician when bidders play these equilibrium strategies. Given our assumptions on X it , these bids will be conditionally independent with strictly positive density on bounded support. Let F it (b|y t ) denote the cdf of bidder i's bid in auction t, which depends on the realized state, and let f it (b|y t ) be the associated pdf. Let G it (b|y) = j =i F jt (b|y) denote the cdf of the highest bid submitted by any of bidder i's competitors conditional on Y t = y t , and let g it (b|y t ) be the associated pdf. Let B i denote the support of b it |Y t , b jt |Y t , b kt |Y t for any bidders i, j, k, and Y t , respectively.
Our main assumption is that the conditional distribution of bids is monotone in the state, in the weak sense that some functional of this conditional distribution is strictly increasing in y t . (See the discussion below.)
is strictly increasing in the state y.
Our assumption that there are at least three bidders i, j, k is important as the third bid 1 For simplicity, we assume that the function v(·, ·) is identical across bidders. Our approach allows v(·, ·) to differ across bidders but, in any case, this distinction is not very important because we will not be able to identify v(·, ·).
2 Under relatively weak additional assumptions, Lebrun (1999) proves that this equilibrium is unique.
Such uniqueness is not essential for identification of bidder values using our approach, as long as (i) some equilibrium is being played and (ii) the monotonicity property of Assumption 1 holds for any selection from the set of equilibria.
b kt plays the role of an instrument for the unobserved heterogeneity Y t . Assumptions 2-3 provide the precise "completeness conditions" that are needed to apply our main result.
Assumption 2 For all i, k and all bounded functions h :
Assumption 3 For all k and all bounded functions h :
If there are only two bidders, our analysis still applies if an appropriate alternative instrument can be found that satisfies Assumptions 2-3 in place of b kt . Loosely speaking, such an instrument must be correlated with the bids but independent of the bids conditional on Y t . For example, consider a timber auction in which Y t denotes the quality of the timber in tract t; this is observed by the bidders but not by the econometrician. An instrument in this context might be average rainfall or soil quality, which is related to timber quality but does not directly affect bidders' valuations.
Discussion of Assumption 1. Assumption 1 is a non-primitive restriction on how the state affects the equilibrium bid distribution. There are several sorts of reasons why the conditional distribution of bids could be affected by the state.
First, bidders' values might vary with the state. For example, in Section 3.1 we consider a setting in which there are two types of bidders and the distribution of each bidder-type's value is stochastically increasing in a "quality" of the good that is not observed by the econometrician. In this case, auction theory establishes that each bidder's equilibrium bid distribution is stochastically increasing in quality. In particular, Assumption 1 would be satisfied by the functional corresponding to the τ -th quantile
Second, the rules of the auction may vary with the state. For example, in Section 3.2, we consider a setting in which the reserve price is unknown to the econometrician. In this case, Assumption 1 is automatically satisfied by the functional corresponding to the minimal observed bid.
Third, participation may vary with the state. For example, in Section 3.3, we consider a setting with costly bidding in which the econometrician does not observe the cost of bidding. In this case, auction theory shows that each bidder's probability of making a bid is decreasing in the cost of participation. Thus, this probability can serve as the functional to satisfy Assumption 1.
Discussion of Assumption 2-3. Assumptions 2-3 are also non-primitive restrictions on the equilibrium bid distribution. If the state-space Y is discrete, and if the bid-space is likewise discretized, Assumption 2 reduces to a requirement that certain matrices are invertible, where these matrices can be constructed from the data. Moreover, in this discrete case, Assumption 3 is implied by Assumption 2. Hence, the completeness conditions can be verified directly in the data when Y is discrete.
When Y is a continuum, however, sufficient conditions for the completeness conditions of Assumptions 2-3 are difficult to find and, indeed, remain an important topic of ongoing research in the literature on non-parametric instrumental variables. See e.g. Newey and Powell (2003) and d 'Haultfoeuille (2009) . One notable special case in which sufficient conditions are available is that of Krasnokutskaya (2009) . In her convolution setting, Assumptions 2-3 are satisfied whenever Y t and X it have non-vanishing characteristic functions.
Identification
Given the joint distribution of observed equilibrium bids in the first-price auction, we will identify the distribution of bidder values conditional on each possible realization of the state. There are two key ingredients to the traditional approach to identify bidder values without unobserved heterogeneity. (See e.g. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Athey and Haile (2002) for a more thorough discussion.) First, the econometrician is assumed to know the distribution of bids in each auction. Second, the assumption of equilibrium bidding is used to infer bidders' values from their bids. Bidder i's expected payoff from submitting bid b takes the form Π it (b|y t ) = (v it −b)G it (b|y t ). For bid b it to be a best response, it must be that b it ∈ arg max b Π it (b|y t ) and hence that the first-order condition (v it − b)g it (b it |y t ) − G it (b it |y t ) = 0 is satisfied. Re-arranging this first-order condition, bidder i's realized private value v it when he bids b it can be expressed simply as his bid plus a mark-up that depends on the elasticity of his probability of winning:
In practice, of course, an econometrician does not observe the true distribution of bids but rather estimates that distribution from a sample of auction data. As long as there is no unobserved heterogeneity, the empirical distribution of bids (controlling for observed heterogeneity) will provide a consistent estimate of the true distribution of bids. However, should there be unobserved heterogeneity, the unconditional empirical distribution of bids will be an invalid estimate and lead to incorrect inference about bidder values.
The main result of this paper is that it is possible to identify each bidder's marginal bid distribution conditional on the state from the unconditional joint distribution of bids. The distribution of bidder values conditional on the state can then be identified in the standard way, through the mark-up condition (1).
Theorem 1
The distribution of b t |Y t and of Y t are identified from the distribution of b t .
Proof. Fix any three bidders i, j, k. We will show that the distributions of b kt |Y t and of Y t are identified from the joint distribution of (b it , b jt , b kt ). Since bids are independent conditional on Y t , and this proof can be repeated for any triplet of bidders, this yields the desired identification of b t |Y t and of Y t .
The following integral operators will be useful in the proof:
In the above and in what follows, variables with bars (¯) denote fixed values. To simplify equations, we shall henceforth drop subscripts from the notation for densities, except where such notation is needed to avoid confusion.
implies that h (y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y. In particular, this means that the linear operator L b kt |Yt is injective. Similarly, Assumption 2 implies that L b it |b kt is injective (details omitted).
Eigenvalue/eigenfunction decomposition. Since bidder values are assumed to be conditionally independent, their bids are also independent conditional on Y t :
In particular, we may express the operator L b kt ,b jt |b it as follows:
In other words,
Next, integrating out
Mimicking the steps above, we may now similarly show that
Since
Substituting this expression in (3), for any fixed b j = b j , yields
By the injectivity of L b kt |b it , finally,
This equation implies that the observed LHS has an eigenvalue and eigenfunction decomposition. The eigenvalues are f (b jt |Y t ) in the diagonal operator D b jt |Yt and the eigenfunctions are f b kt |Yt (·|Y t ) in the operator L b kt |Yt . The unobserved heterogeneity Y t is the index for the eigenvalues and eigenfunctions. Assumption 1 implies that the eigenvalues are distinctive.
The conditional density f (b kt |Y t ) of bidder k's bid is identified from this eigenfunction decomposition. Also, note that both
Discussion of Theorem 1. Theorem 1 allows the econometrician to "decompose" an unconditional observed joint distribution of bids into a mixture of conditionally independent bid distributions. The assumption that bidder values are independent conditional on the unobserved state is essential to the proof as it helps establish the eigenvalue decomposition of (7). Extending the analysis to settings in which the joint distribution of bids may be correlated (e.g. affiliated) conditional on the state is an important albeit challenging area for future work.
Given the conditional distribution of bids, the mark-up formula (1) allows one to identify the distribution of values conditional on each realization of the state Y t ∼ U [0, 1]. This decomposition can then be used to conduct valid ex ante or counterfactual analysis. However, it is worth emphasizing that the econometrician cannot in general infer the true distribution of bids in any particular auction. That is, for any auction t, our results do not allow us to infer the realized state in that particular auction. 3 Fortunately, for the sake of valid ex ante or counterfactual analysis, the econometrician does not need to observe the true state in each auction. It suffices to identify the distribution of the bids (and hence bidder values) conditional on each realization of the state. This is what Theorem 1 provides.
Discussion of related literature
This paper is most closely related to Krasnokutskaya (2009) . In that path-breaking paper, Krasnokutskaya provided conditions under which results from the literature on classical measurement error can be used to identify IPV first-price auction models in the face of unobserved heterogeneity.
Krasnokutskaya considers a model in which each bidder receives an independent private signal X it , all bidders observe the unobserved heterogeneity Y t which is independent of X it for all i, and bidder values take the multiplicatively-separable form V it = X it * Y t . In this case, equilibrium bids also scale multiplicatively with
Each observed bid now takes the form of classical measurement error, where the b it is a convolution of the unobserved variable of interest Y t with b i (X it ), the bidder-specific idiosyncratic component. The literature on classical measurement error shows how to identify the distribution of the variable of interest, as well as the distribution of the error, given just two measurements. This result is due to Kotlarski; see the discussion in Rao (1992) .
Our paper can be viewed as an extension of Krasnokutskaya (2009) , in which we relax some of her assumptions in order to broaden the scope of potential applications. Namely, we weaken two key assumptions. First, we allow the unobserved heterogeneity to have a non-separable effect on the distribution of bids, as well as an asymmetric effect on the bids of different bidders. In particular, we require only that some location of the distribution of equilibrium bids be increasing in Y t . This condition is automatically satisfied in Krasnokutskaya's setting, since the mean of each bidder's equilibrium bid is not only increasing but linear in Y t . Second, we allow for the possibility that bidders' private signals are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity.
On the other hand, we do maintain several of Krasnokutskaya's assumptions. We continue to assume that (i) bidders' values are independent conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity and (ii) the unobserved heterogeneity is one-dimensional. Furthermore, whereas Krasnokutskaya needs to observe only two bids per auction, we require three bids per auction, or else two bids plus an appropriate alternative instrument.
By insisting only on a monotone relationship between bids and unobserved heterogeneity, rather than a multiplicative one, our approach opens up a wide variety of potential new applications. Several such applications are discussed in the next section.
Examples
This section provides a variety of novel applications in which this paper's approach may be applied to non-parametrically identify the distribution of bidder values in the face of unobserved heterogeneity. In all of these examples, except for that of Section 3.1 in which bidders are not symmetric, we assume for simplicity that there are n ≥ 3 symmetric bidders with iid private values conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity.
Quality as unobserved heterogeneity
Suppose that the good for sale has a quality Q t that is observed by the bidders but not by the econometrician. Without loss, we may normalize the distribution of quality so that 
By Proposition 1, the monotonicity property of Assumption 1 is satisfied by the functional corresponding to bidder i's maximal bid.
Proposition 1 In this example, the maximal bid of each bidder is strictly increasing in the realized quality.
Proof. Lebrun (1998) establishes comparative statics on equilibrium bids when the distribution of just one type of bidder increases. Namely, suppose that the distribution of type-A bidders is increased from v A (X it , q t ) to v A (X it , q ′ t ) for some q ′ t > q t , while type-B bidders' values remain distributed as v B (X it , q t ). Lebrun (1998) shows that every (type A and type B) bidder's equilibrium bid distribution weakly increases in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. Furthermore, this increase is strict over the range of submitted bids. (If negative values are possible, each bidder will choose not to bid with positive probability.) In particular, the maximal bid submitted by each bidder strictly increases. Repeating this argument as type-B bidders' values are increased from v B (X it , q t ) to v B (X it , q ′ t ) establishes the desired result, that each bidder's maximal bid is strictly increasing in quality.
Since Assumption 1 is satisfied, our approach can identify the distribution of bids conditional on each realization of quality, if the completeness conditions of Assumptions 2-3 also hold. Unfortunately, as we discussed earlier, sufficient conditions on model primitives for completeness are not available outside of certain special cases (such as the log-convolution case studied by Krasnokutskaya (2009) ). For this reason, in what follows we treat completeness as given, and focus on verifying the more novel monotonicity condition of Assumption 1 for each example.
Reserve price as unobserved heterogeneity
In some auctions, the seller has the right to refuse to sell to the highest bidder. If so, the true reserve price may be higher than the minimal feasible bid specified in the auction rules. Suppose that the auction has a reserve price R t that is known to the bidders but not to the econometrician. Assume for simplicity that bidders' independent private values are drawn from the same interval support and that the reserve price is always in the interior of this support. By Proposition 1, the monotonicity property of Assumption 1 is satisfied by the functional corresponding to each bidder's minimal submitted bid. 4
Proposition 2 In this example, the minimal submitted bid by each bidder is strictly increasing in the realized reserve price.
Proof. Since by assumption the reserve price is sometimes (but not always) binding, the minimal submitted bid equals the reserve price and the desired result is immediate.
What is identified? Theorem 1 identifies the distribution of bids conditional on each possible realization of some normalization of the reserve price. For example, one can identify the distribution of bids conditional on the realized reserve price being equal to its median, without this median reserve price itself being directly identified. In this particular example, this distinction is unimportant, since the reserve price can be inferred from the conditional distribution of bids. (Indeed, this is the observation behind Proposition 2: the reserve price is equal to the minimal bid in the support of the distribution of bids conditional on that reserve price.) Given the distribution of bids, one may identify the distribution of values by the mark-up formula (1) conditional on a bid being made above the reserve. In particular, since each bidder submits a bid in equilibrium iff his value exceeds the reserve price, one may identify the distribution of values as truncated above the reserve price.
Bidding cost as unobserved heterogeneity
Suppose that the reserve price is zero, but some bidders choose not to participate because of a common cost C t > 0 of submitting a bid that is random and independent of bidders' valuations. (Bidders observe their values and then decide whether to bid.) Proposition 3 In this example, the probability of non-participation by each bidder is strictly increasing in the realized bidding cost.
Proof. In the unique symmetric bidding equilibrium given C t = c, there is a threshold value v(c) such that (i) each bidder submits a bid iff its value exceeds v(c) and (ii) bidders having value equal to v(c) bid zero and earn zero net expected surplus. In particular, this threshold value is determined by the indifference condition
where What is identified? Theorem 1 identifies the distribution of bids conditional on each realization of the unobserved heterogeneity, but additional steps are needed to identify the realized bidding cost itself. As in the unobserved reserve price example of Section 3.2, bidders submit bids iff their values exceed a threshold. Thus, the mark-up condition (1) can be used to identify the distribution of bidder values above this threshold. In particular, v(c) is identified as the minimal value given which a bid is made. Finally, since the probability
n−1 that none of n − 1 bidders will submit a bid can be identified directly from the data, the distribution of the bidding cost C t is identified through (8).
Number of bidders as unobserved heterogeneity
Suppose that N t symmetric bidders choose to participate in an auction with zero reserve price, where N t is random and common knowledge among the participating bidders before the bidding, and each participating bidder's value is drawn iid from the same distribution regardless of N t . 5 The econometrician observes detailed bid-data for three bidders i, j, k, i.e. whether they chose to participate and what they bid, but does not observe the bids made by other bidders, nor the total number of bidders. 6 Such a scenario could arise if a researcher has acquired data from individual bidders only.
The condition here that the distribution of bidder values does not depend on N t is naturally satisfied in several sorts of settings. For example, suppose that participation is costly, that bidders observe their values before deciding to participate, and then observe the number of participating bidders before submitting their bids. The equilibrium distribution of participating bidders' values in this case will be just a truncation of the original distribution of values. Or, if bidders do not observe their values until they decide to participate, then obviously the distribution of participating bidders' values will just be the original distribution. Or, finally, participation might simply be exogenous, as when participants are comprised of "random passers-by".
Proposition 4
In this example, the mean bid of each bidder is strictly increasing in the realized number of bidders.
Proof. This result follows from well-known properties of the first-price auction with symmetric independent private values: 7 (i) there is a unique equilibrium in symmetric strategies and (ii) each bidder's equilibrium bid is strictly increasing in the number of bidders in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, each participating bidder's mean bid is strictly increasing in the number of bidders.
What is identified? Theorem 1 identifies the distribution of bids conditional on each possible realization of a normalization of N t . Let Y t = γ(N t ) denote this normalization. Without loss, suppose that γ(·) is strictly increasing. Let n(·) = γ −1 (·) so that n(Y t ) = N t .
Unfortunately, the distribution of bidder values cannot be identified from the distribution of bids unless one also knows the number of bidders. For any quantile α ∈ (0, 1), let v t (α) and 5 See An, Hu, and Shum (forthcoming) for an analysis of a related model where the number of potential bidders is unobserved by the econometrician due to a binding reserve price, which is fixed across auctions. In this example, in contrast, the number of realized bidders constitutes the unobserved heterogeneity. b t (α|y) denote the α-th quantiles of the (symmetric) distributions of bidder values and equilibrium bids conditional on Y t = y, respectively. (Recall that, by assumption, the distribution of bidder values does not depend on the number of bidders.) Conditional on Y t = y, the probability that a bidder wins the object with bid b t (α|y) is simply G t (b t (α|y)|y) = α n(y)−1 . Consequently, for each α ∈ (0, 1), the mark-up formula (1) may be re-written as
Although b t (α|y) is identified by Theorem 1, v t (α) cannot be identified from (9) as long as n(y) is unknown. However, surprisingly, it is possible to identify the true distribution of N t but only if the number of bidders is random.
Non-random number of bidders. Suppose first that supp(N t ) is a singleton. In this case, bidder values and the number of bidders cannot possibly be separately identified. Indeed, (9) can be satisfied for any number of bidders n(y) ≥ 2, given larger (smaller) mark-ups and hence higher (lower) values for smaller (larger) n(y).
Random number of bidders. Consider now the more interesting case in which supp(N t ) contains at least two elements, so that supp(Y t ) also contains at least two elements. For any pair of quantilesα, α and pairỹ, y ∈ supp(Y t ), note that
(Both sides of (10) are equal to v t (α), while both sides of (11) are equal to v t (α).)
We have already identified all variables in the system of equations (10-11) except for (n(ỹ), n(y)). N t is therefore identified, as long as (10-11) has a unique solution for all y, y ∈ supp(Y t ). 8 Given the distribution of N t = n(Y t ), one may now identify the distribution of bidder values from the first-order condition (9).
8 Theα-th and α-th quantiles of the distribution of bidder values solve (10-11). Thus, this system always has at least one solution under our maintained assumptions about the data generating process. As can be easily shown, it has a unique solution as long as the matrix A =
# is invertible.
Monte Carlo Exercise
In this section, we describe results from a Monte Carlo simulation exercise, employing a first-price auction model with unobserved bidding costs as in Section 3.3. We assume that there are n = 3 bidders, each drawing an iid private value V it ∼ U [0, 1], for i = 1, . . . , n, across all auctions t = 1, . . . , T . The bidding cost is known to the bidders but unobserved by the econometrician, iid across auctions, and ex ante uniformly distributed C t ∈ U [0, 1].
(To simplify equations, we shall henceforth drop notation for the auction t.)
The threshold value v(c) for submitting a bid in the unique symmetric equilibrium of an auction with realized bidding cost C t = c is
In equilibrium, bidders do not bid when v ≤ v(c), bid zero when v = v(c), and otherwise submit a positive bid. The equilibrium bid function solves:
with b(v(c); c) = 0. (See Milgrom and Weber (1982) for these formulae, especially pg. 1107 and pg. 1112.)
We performed 400 replications of the Monte Carlo experiment. In each replication, we simulated data from 10000 auctions. (We need a large sample size because all the estimators are nonparametric.) For each auction t, we drew a bidding cost C ∼ U [0, 1] and computed the corresponding bidding threshold value v(C) = C 1/n . Subsequently, we drew valuations V 1 , . . . , V n ∼ U [0, 1], and generated the equilibrium bids b * (V i ; C) for all bidders whose realized values exceeded the bidding threshold, V i ≥ v(C), using the last equation in (12). For each replication, we estimated the equilibrium conditional bid densities, and also the distribution of bidding costs, using a sieve MLE procedure.
In Figure 1 , we graph the average estimated equilibrium bid densities across the replications, for different values of the bidding threshold v(c) (or, equivalently, for different bidding costs c). In these graphs, to avoid complications due to nonparametric density estimation near the boundary of the support of bids, we trimmed off portions of the density functions corresponding to the bids in the intervals [0, 0.1] and [0.6, 0.67], regions adjoining the lower bound and the upper bound of the support of bids. (With three bidders, the maximal bid ever submitted in equilibrium is 0.67.) These graphs show that, for most values ofc, the estimated density functions are reasonably close to the "true" density function. (This "true" density function is a kernel estimate using the simulated latent data directly, i.e. as if the econometrician observed the true bidding cost as well as the bidding data.) Moreover, in all cases the "true" density function lies mostly within the confidence bands of the estimated density functions.
In Figure 2 , we graph the estimated density function of the normalized bidding costs, again averaged over all the replications. The estimated and actual graphs are almost coincident, except in the upper tail of values ofc t .
[ Discussion of estimation procedure. Our identification results imply that the unknown densities f (b kt |Y t ), f (b jt |Y t ), and f (Y t |b it ) are uniquely determined by the observed f (b kt , b jt |b it ) through equation (2). In this Monte Carlo exercise, we assume all the bid distributions conditional on unobserved heterogeneity are the same. In particular,
so that there are (only) two unknown densities f b|Y and f Y on the RHS of (2). Note that
where the function space A contains the true densities. This suggests a corresponding nonparametric sieve MLE using an i.i.d. sample {b kt , b jt , b it } t=1,...,T :
where A n is a sequence of approximating sieve spaces. An advantage of the sieve MLE is that it reduces an infinite-dimensional maximization problem to a finite-dimensional one. See Hu and Schennach (2009) for details on the sieve MLE and its asymptotic properties.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a novel approach to nonparametrically identify first-price auction models with independent private values in the face of one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. The key assumption that we require is that the state has a monotone effect on the distribution of bids, in the weak sense that some functional of this distribution be strictly increasing in the state. Fortunately, such monotonicity arises naturally with respect to a wide variety of sources of unobserved heterogeneity, including: product quality (Section 3.1), reserve price (Section 3.2), bidding cost (Section 3.3), and number of bidders (Section 3.4). 
